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Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control
ABSTRACT
Weexamineperformanceand management characteristics of Fortune500
firmsexperiencingone ofthreetypesof control change: internally
pricipitated management turnover, hostile takeover, and friendlytakeover.
We find that firms experiencing internally precipitated management turnover
perform poorly relative to other firms in their industries, but are not
concentrated in poorly performing industries. In contrast, targets of
hostile takeovers are concentrated in troubled industries. There is also
weaker evidence that hostile takeover targets underperform their industry
peers. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the idea that the board
of directors is capable of firing managers whose leadership leads to poor
performance relative to industry, but that an external challenge in the form
of a hostile takeover is often required when th. whole industry is in
decline.
The evidence also indicates that firms run by a me.ber of the founding
family are less likely to experience either internally precipitated top
management turnover or a hostili takeover. On the other hand, firms whose
top management team is dominated by a single, relatively young top executive,
while lacking in internal discipline, are more likely to experience a hostile
takeover.
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1. Introduction.
Ineffective boards of directors have been held responsible for many woes
of American companies (Mace, 1971, Jensen, 1986), including the advent of
hostile takeovers. The board is blamed for both failing to recognize the
problems of the firm, and for failing to stand up to top officers when tough
solutions to these problems are needed. Where the board fails, external
control devices come to play a role.
An alternative view suggests that the board serves its monitoring and
control functions effectively (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Consistent with this
view, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and
Weisbach (1988) find that poor performance of the firm increases the
likelihoodof chief Executive Officer (CEO) replacement, and attribute this
to monitoring by the board. Evidently, board, can deal with at least some of
the problems of the firm.
The question then is: which problems of the firm can the board of
directors deal with effectively and which ones instead trigger the external
control market? Arguably, the board's effectiveness depends in part on
whether the problem experienced by the firm is idiosyncratic or industry-
wide. In theformercase,it mightbe relatively easy for the board to
assessblame and fire a CEO whose leadership causes the company to
underperfora its otherwise healthy industry. In the case of industry-wide
problems, such as those caused by foreign competition, technological
progress, or deregulation, the board's problem is much harder. It isthen
lessclear that the fin is making mistakes •orwhat those mistakes are, when
the whole industry is suffering. With this kind of uncertainty, most boards
would be reluctant to blame the CEO for the firm's problems, let alone fire
him. Even when the board understands that changes are needed, it might3
refuseto force the current CEO (or his replacement) to divest divisions,
close plants lay off workers, cut wages, and take other painful measures
that might increase profits in a declining industry. Under these
circumstances, an external challenge to the board's authority may be
necessary to enforce shareholder wealth maximization.
The board's effectiveness also depends on the status and power of the
CEO. Some managers, by virtue of their ability, ownership stake, tenure, or
statusas founders might be able to dominate theboard,rather than be
controlled byit whatever problems the company faces. If the board's
comparative advantage is to deal with certain types of problems end with
handling particularCEOscompanies going through internallycaused
management turnover will be different than targets of hostile takeovers. By
contrasting the characteristics of the two types of firms, this paper tries
to find out what boards do in fact accomplish.
Our analysis focuses on three alternative means of control change in a
sampleof 454publicly-tradedFortune 500 companies thatwe follow between
1981 and 1985. The control methods thatwe studyinclude internally-caused
complete turnover of the top officers of the corporation, friendly sale of
the company, and the hostile takeover1. Complete turnover of top managers
appears to be thebest measure of forced internally precipitated change, as
opposed to orderly transitions. We do not treat ordinary internal succession
as a control change, since those do notusually represent responses to
management problems (Vancfl, 1987). In fact, we present evidence insection
4that, far from being used as a disciplinarydevice, internal succession is
associated with abnormally good performance. Friendly acquisitions are
'Other recent studies of thecharacteristicsof takeover targets include
Masbrouck(1985),Palepu (1986), Ravenscraft andScherer (1987), and Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1988).4
studied because they too represent control changes, but not necessarily of
the same disciplinary nature as hostile takeovers (Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1988, present evidence on this point). As such, friendly
acquisitions provide a useful contrast to both hostile takeovers and
internally-caused complete turnover.
We findthat complete top management turnover is associated primarily
with poorperformance of a fin relative to its industry and not with adverse
industryshocks. Incontrast, hostile takeovers are targeted at firms
concentrated in troubled industries. While targets of hostile takeovers also
underperformtheir already troubled industries, this effect is less
pronounced than poor performance of their industries. Thisevidence is
consistentwith the following conclusions: In many cases, boards of directors
succeed in comparing the performance of their companies to the industry
standard,and in dismissing management teams that underperformtheindustry.
In contrast, boards typically fail to deal with problems faced by an entire
industryintrouble. These boards are either unsure that management is doing
a bad job inresponding to the adverse industry shock,or they refuse to
forcechanges that an improvement of profits requires, such as divisional
selloffs or wage reductions. In this respect firms acquired in friendly
deals are more similar to firms experiencing complete turnover thanthey are
totargets of hostile takeovers. To the extent that they are disciplinary at
all, friendly deals seem to be encouraged by corporate boards that are faced
with poor performance relative to a healthy industry.
We also find that fins run by members of the founding family and CEOs
with large direct ownership are less likely to experience either complete
management turnover or a hostile takeover. Both disciplinary devices are
less effective against CEOs with strong attachment to the firm, who eitherS
control the board or can better weather a hostile threat. In an additional
attempt to measure poor internal discipline, we focus on firms where the top
management team consists of a single individual. We define such firms as
cases where only one executive holds any of the three titles of chairman,
chief executive officer and president and where he is also alone in s&gning
the letter to shareholders in the annual report. We find that, as long as
suchone-man firms are run by a young topexecutive, they are less likely
thanan average firm to experience complete turnover of the management team,
but.more likely than an average firm to be a target of a hostile takeover.
Hostile takeovers may thus be a way to deal with these young Thosses" whom
the board cannot effectively control.
In suary, our evidence indicates that, given the current capabilities
ofboards of directors, internal turnover and hostile takeovers provide
complementary meansof enforcing maximization of shareholder value.2 Hostile
takeovers become relevant precisely when the problems of the firm and the
status of top management make the board's disciplinary role too difficult to
performeffectively.
Section 2 of the paper discusses the data we use in our empirical work,
and presents the basic characteristics of firms that undergo different forms
of control changes. Section 3 presents the main empirical results that
attempt to identify characteristics conducive to particular means of control
change.Section 4 compares firmsexperiencing complete turnover of the
managementtea -.usedas a proxy for disciplinary turnover -- withfirms
experiencing a partial turnover of top management.Section5 concludes.
2which does not necessarily coincide with social welfare; see Shleifer
and Vishny (1988) and Shleifer andSunars(1988).6
2.Basic results on alternative forts of control change.
The question raised in the introduction is whether the form of control
change depends on a firms performance problems and characteristics of top
managers. This section compares mean characteristics of firms that were
acquired in a friendly deal, a hostile deal or that underwent an internally
precipitated control change. The subsequent section presents a multinomial
logit model in which all the determinants of alternative types of change are
treated simultaneously.
2a. Types of Management Changes.
The analysis in this paper is based on the sample of all publicly traded
1980 Fortune 500 firms. Of the 454 firms in the sample, 82 have been
acquired by third parties or went through a management buyout (MBO) in the
period 1981-1985. Based on an examination of the Wall Street Journal Index.
40 of those appear to have started hostile and 42 friendly. We call an
acquisition hostile if the initial bid for the target (which need not be a
bid by the eventual acquiror) was neither negotiated with its board prior to
being made nor accepted by the board as made. Initial rejection by the
target's board is thus taken asevidenceof the bidder's hostility, as is
active management resistance to the bid, escape to a white knight, or a
management buyout in response to unsolicited pressure. We sort acquisitions
on the basis of the initial mood because we are interested in firm
characteristics that sparked the bidding in the first place. Targets that
are not classified as hostile are called friendly.
Following the analysis of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), we exclude
friendlyMBOs -- thoseproposed by management in the absence of visible
evidenceof outside takeover threat --fromour sample of acquisitions, since7
they neither represent control changes nor resemble ordinary targets of
friendly offers in their characteristics. This reduces the sample of
friendly acquisitions to 34. Also following the evidence in Morck, Shleifer
and Vishny (1988), we treat hostile )thOs •-thatare defensive responses to &
hostilebid or 13-D filing --asif they were regular hostile takeovers. Our
sample of hostile takeovers stays at 40 observations.
Among the firmsthathave not been acquired, we define complete
turnover as a complete change between 1980 and 1985 in the list of officers
signingthe letter to shareholders in the annualreport.A firmexperiences
acomplete turnover if none of the officers whosignedthe annualreportin
1980also signs in 1985. An alternative way to define complete turnover
would be using changes in the list of people holding top titles rather than
in the list of signers. The trouble with following this path is that titles
can be retained by figureheads, who have no effective control or power.
Signing the annual report, in contrast, seems to be a more effective proxy
for leadership. We focus on complete rather than partial turnover of
signaturesbecause we are interested in disciplinary management changes
forced by the board. Presumably, most changes in which one co-signer of the
annual report replaces another represent ordinary succession rather than
disciplinary actionby the board. The results in section 4 strongly support
thisconclusion.
Wherea company has experienced a managementturnoverprior to a hostile
takeover, this company is treated as an acquisition and not as a turnover.
This happens in 4 out of 40 hostile takeovers. While in these cases the
board is arguably trying to deal with the management problems, it is not
providing an adequate solution. A takeover ii still required to provide an
alternative that mimizes shareholder wealth. Similarly, if management8
turnsover prior to a friendly acquisition, which also happens in 4 out of 34
cases, the turnover cannot be properly viewed as solving the need for new
management. Accordingly, we classify these cases as friendly acquisitions.
Theabove definition yields 93 cases of complete turnover. This number
seems too high as a measure of disciplinary turnover,and doubtless still
includescases of ordinary succession. Some suchnon-disciplinarycases
mightbeplanned CEO retirements accompanied by the appointment of an outside
replacementteam, but such cases are rare (Vancil, 1987). More commonly,
these would be cases where the planned internal successor did not come from
the list of 1980 signers of the annual report. Overall, although our
definition probably covers most extraordinary non-takeover-related management
changes, it also covers some cases of ordinary replacement that only add
noise.
In section 4, we separately look at the cases of partial turnover, in
which the Forbes-listed top executive (usually the CEO) changes between 1980
and 1985 but there is no complete turnover in the list of signers of the
letter to shareholders. (The Forbes-listed top executive is alway. among the
signersofthe letter to shareholders in the annual report.) Our sample
includes70 cases of such partial turnover. Arguably, incumbent top
executivesare partly competing for their Jobs with other executives in the
company. On that theory, even replacement by a member of the same management
team can be disciplinary. Our view, supported by the results of section 4,
is that most of the partial turnovers in our sample representordinary
successionand not disciplinary changes. Accordingly, we focus on complete
turnover to gauge the effectiveness of the board as a control device.
2b. Performance Characteristics by Type of Control Change.9
This study uses three different measures of performance: average robin's
Q, stock market abnormal returns, and employment growth rates. Average
Tobin's Q is equal to the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement
cost of its physical assets. As such, Tobin's Q can be viewed as measuring
the intangible assets of the firm. These may include future growth
opportunities, monopoly power, goodwill, rents appropriated away from unions,
as well as the quality of management. Our measure of Q was obtained from the
Griliches It & D Master File (Cummins, Hall and Laderman, 1982) for 1980. The
numeratoris the sumof the actual marketvalue of the firm's coon stock
and estimated market values of preferred stock and debt3. The denominator of
Qisthereplacementcost of the firm's plant andinventories,A, also taken
fromthe It SI) Master File. Values of Qarenot available for 85 firms,
primarily because of the difficulty of obtaining values of long term debt
and,in some cases, replacement cost A. Ourfinalsample for results using Q
consistsof 371 firms.Theseinclude80cases of complete turnover,31
hostile takeovers,and 17 friendly acquisitions.
Since we are looking at an imperfectly measured Q, the interpretation of
Q asa measure of the valuation of intangible assets canbeproblematic. The
replacement cost of assets could be overstated, for example, if the firm
The market value of comeon stock is taken from Standard andPoor's
COMFUSTAT tape. The marketvalueof preferred stock is estimated by dividing
the preferred stock dividend figure (reported on COMPUSTAT) by the Moody's
preferred dividend rate for the median-risk companies. The market value of
the fin's debt is taken as the value of its short ten liabilities net of
its short-term assets (from COMPUSTAT) plus an estimate of the market value
of its long-term debt. Estimates of long-ten debt for ourfirms were
obtained from the NBfl's R&D Master File (see Cu—ins, Hall. and Laderman,
1982). These estimates are constructed on the assumption that all long-term
debt has an orignial maturity of 20 years •andusing a matrix of bond prices
in year t for bonds due in year s from the Moody's corporate BAA bond price
series. The age structure of corprate debt is estimated from changes in the
firm's book value of long-term debt in each of the 20 previous years on the
COMPUSTAT tape. Using this age structure estimate end the bond price matrix,
Cunins et al. (1982) calculate the value of each fin's long-term debt.10
bought its assets tong ago and their value depreciated significantly because
of technological progress, foreign competition, or other changes. In these
cases, the inflation-adjusted historical cost is a poor guide to the true
replacementcost,but avery low Q is probably stilta reliable indicator of
adeclining firm.
Our second measure of performance is the cumulative abnormal return over
theperiod 1978-1980, calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The
dataforreturns are the standard monthly series from the Center for Research
in Securities Prices. The reason for using abnormal returns is that they
capture the market's evaluation of more recent news about thefin's
currentand future profitability. Our sample using returns consists of 427
non-OTC firms, of which B7 went through complete turnover of management, 37
were targets of hostile takeovers, and 32 of friendly ones.
Our thirdmeasure of performance is employment growth over the 1978-
1980 period. Although employment growth is notanunambiguousmeasureof
performance, we useit for tworeasons. First, it is more closely related to
the business side, as opposed to being based on stock market prices. Use of
such a measure enables us to say that takeover targets are not characterized
solely by being priced by the market below the tru. value of their earnings
streams under their current operating strategies. Second, employment growth
seems like a fairly reliable measure of industry health even though it may be
an ambiguous measure of f in performance within an industry. Our sample
using employment growth consists of 449 firms, of which 93 went through
complete turnover of management, 39 were targets of hostile takeovers, and 34
of friendly ones.
Although we consider takeovers and management changes during the period
1981 to 1985, all our performance measures are calculated based on the data11
from a prior period. This ii done for two reasons. First1 it is difficult
to find an appropriat. way to compare performance of firms that experienced
control changes between 1981 and 1985 with those that experienced none,
except by looking at all of them prior to the hazard period. While for the
sample of firma experiencing change it might be more natural to look at
performance closer to the time of that change, there is no natural time frame
in which to measure performance of firms where the management stayed intact.
More importantly, in choosing a prior period, our aim was to avoid mixing in
the effects of the market's anticipation of future restructuring activity.
Starting in the early 1980s. a large component of market valuation of many
industrial fins may have been traceable to the expected premium from a
takeover or a restructuring. Prior to that period, corporate restructurings
were less prominent, and hence it is likely that the market valued fins
primarily as going concerns under the current management. Since two of our
three performance measures are based on stock market prices, our results
depend on these prices reflecting expected future profitability under current
management, and not the expected premium from a control change.
For all three performance measures, we look separately at industry-wide
and firm-specific performance. For each fins in the sample, we consider both
the average Q of iti industry at the 3-digit SIC code level and the deviation
of its Q fro, the average Q of its industry. Analagously, we look at both
industryabnormalreturns, and atthe deviation of the firm s abnormal,return
fromthe industryaverage,as well as at industry-wide and firm-specific
employment growth rates. This differentiation between industry effects and
firm-specific effects is the main contribution of thisstudy.We are
interested in finding out whether boards respond differentially to industry-12
wide and firm-specific problems, and whether takeovers are differentially
targeted at firms with these distinct types of problems.
Table 1 presents the means of performance measures of our sample
companies for four categories of firms.Thefirst three Categories include
firms that experienced one of the three types of management change: complete
turnover, hostile takeover, or friendly acquisition; the fourth category
includes the remaining ('residual") firms. The results suggest that firms
experiencing complete turnover or a hostile takeover have an average Q
statistically significantly lower than that of residual firms.robin'sQ of
complete turnover firmsis.734, which is 27% below Tobins Q of residual
firmsequalto .932 (t—-2.20). Tobin's Q ofhostile takeover targets is
.524,which is 44% below .932 (t—-3.OO). In contrast, Tobin's Q of firms
acquired in a friendly deal is .774, which while lower than that of residual
firms,isnot statistically significantly so.
Thedecomposition of Qinto an industry-specific component, IQ, and a
firm-specificcomponent,DQ,revealsimportant differences between hostile
takeoversand complete turnover as control devices4. While among firms
experiencing complete turnover IQ is not appreciably lower than it is for
residual firms, among hostile takeover targets IQ is on average 19% below
thatfor residual firms(t—-2.02).Tothe extent thatIQmeasures industry
performance,this evidence indicates that hostile takeovers are targeted at
firmsintroubled industries, but that complete management turnover is not
associatedwith industry troubles.
4Note that in Table 1 the means of the industry andwithin industry
componentsof the performance variables do not sum identically to the means
of the performance variables themselves. This happens because the means are
calculated using slightly different subsamples due to missing data.13
Theevidence on fin-specific performance, as measured by DQ, shows that
both targets of hostile acquisitions and firms experiencing complete turnover
underperform their industries. Complete turnover fins have an average DQ of
-.14, which is significantly below DQ for no outcome firms(t—-2.56).
Hostile targets also have an average DQ of -.14,with the test for equality
vis a vis no outcome firms having a t-statistic of .1.79.
Although fins sold to friendly acquirors show both DQ and EQ below that
of residual, firms, these differences in performance arenotstatistically
significant.Moreover, they are not nearly aslargein magnitud. asthe
corresponding performance shortfalls of hostile takeover and complete
turnover firms. We cannot then conclude that targets of friendly
acquisitions are concentrated in troubled industries, or that they
significantlyunderperform their industries. Friendly acquisitions are not
significantly related to performance as measured by Q.IQor DQ.
The results using abnormal stock returns during the period 1978-1980 are
alsopresented in Table 1. Evidence on cumulative 1978-1980 abnormal returns
largely but not always corroborates that on Tobin's Q. Overthisperiod,
firmsexperiencingcomplete turnover or hostile takeover have abnormal
returns of -7.3%and-11.3% respectively, compared to +5.2% for firms
experiencingno controloutcome. Targets of friendly bids have 1978-1980
abnormal returns of -5.6%, but this is not reliablydifferent than the
abnormal returns for no outcome firms. Also, consistent with the results on
Q, the industry abnormal return is -8.5% for targets of hostile takeovers,
and+1.4% for complete turnoverfirms.
Theresults on Tobins Q and on abnormal returns are also in some ways
different. First, the fin-specific component of abnormal returns for
hostile takeover targets is not reliably different from the fin-specific14
abnormal return for no outcome firms. The univariate returns datathus
suggest thathostile takeovers are primarily associated with industry-wide
troublesand less with fin-specific trouble., while the converse is true
aboutcomplete turnover. Some multivariate tests of whether firm-specific
problemsmatter for hostile takeovers are presented in Section 3.
The second interesting differencà between the results using Tobin's Q
andabnormal returns is the evidence on friendly acquisitions. During the
1978-1980 period, the industry-wide abnormal return on these firms is +9.4%,
but the firm-specific abnormal return is -14.9%. which is different from that
for no outcome firms at the 5% level. This suggests that targets of friendly
acquisitions, like firms undergoing complete turnover of top management, are
experiencing some firm-specific problems prior to control change.
Evidence on employment growth for 1978-1980 closely mirrors that for
1978-1980 stock market returns. Firms experiencing complete turnover have
substantially lower employment growth rates than their industry peers,
whereas those industry peers grow at rates comparable to the rest of the
Fortune 500. Targets of hostile takeovers are in low employment growth
industries,andthere is weak evidence that these firms also lag their
industrypeers. Finally, targets of friendly bide are inindustrieswith
high employment growth, but significantly lag behind their industry peers.
Despitethe close parallels between the results for stock market returns
andemployment growth, these employment numbers should be interpreted with
caution. A high level of employment growth relative to industryneers is not
necessarily a signal of superior performance, since excessive employment
growth can itself be an important deviation from value-maximization. At the
sametime, industry-wide employment growth is probably a reliable indicator
of industry health. Accordingly, ourfindingthattargets of hostile15
takeovers belong to industries with low employment growth supports our
interpretation of the results for Tobin's Qandabnormal returns as related
to poor performance and not just to stock market undervaluation.
The inconsistency of our results for friendly acquisitions using
alternative performance variables should probably be attributed to the
different aspects of performance that Tobin's Qandthe other two variables
measure. Targets of friendly mergers are often thought to have considerable
intangible assets, such as a growing customer base, to which the acquiror can
add management skills or access to capital. As a result of having such
intangible assets, these firms are unlikely to have a low measured Tobin's Q,
evenif theyare performing poorly. Our evidencewouldthen suggest that the
likelycandidate. for a friendly acquisition are firms with considerable
intangible assets that have recently underperformed their industry.
Althoughno clear picture emerges for performance characteristics of
friendly acquisitions, the results support a consistent picture of
performanc. of firmssubjectto disciplinary" control changes. Whether
performance is measured usingTobin'sQ,stockmarketreturns, oremployment
growth,poor industry performance isprevalent among targets of hostile
takeovers,in contrast, firms experiencing completemanagement turnover are
best characterized by their poor performance relative to their own industries
and not by poor industry performance. The evidence is less clear as to
whether poor performance within industry is also important in predicting
hostile takeovers.
2c. Management Characteristics.
Performance alone does not determine which (ifany)control devices are
used; characteristics of top management may alsobeimportant. Some of those16
considered here have been previously studied by Morek, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988) to compare targets of hostile and friendly acquisitions. These
include the age of the Forbes-specified top executive, his equity position in
1980, and a dummy indicating whether a member of the top management tea is
from the founding family. The equity position of the Forbes-listed top
executive, obtained from the 1980 Corporate Data Exchange Directory of
Fortune 500 companies, can proxy for both the degree of entrenchment and the
financial incentive to accept a friendly offer5. Top officer members of the
founding family, identified by looking at a sequence of annual reports
extending if necessary to the turn of the century, may have a special ability
to resist challenges to their control even without a substantial ownership
stake by virtue of having hand-picked the board over the years. Age is
obtained from 10-K forms.
This paper uses one additional measure of the status of the top
executive not used in our previous research. This dummy variable, called
BOSS, is obtained from 1980 annual reports of our sample companies. BOSS is
set equal to 1 if only one executive holds any of the three titles of
Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer that exist in the company
and he is also the sole signerof the letter to shareholders in theannual
report. Of the 113 executives who satisfy the first criterion all but 12
satisfythe second; the rest cosign the annualreport with a Vice Chairman or
aVice President and hence are arguably not completely alone at the helm.
TheBOSS variable thus tries to identify top executives who either completely
Walkling and Long (1984) find that managers with a larger stake are
less likely to resist a tender offer. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find
that management ownership reduces the likelihood of hostile bids, and raises
that of friendly ones.Li
dominate the management of their company, or else have no internal
replacementin mind.
SinceBOSSes are alone at the helm, their retirement or removal is, by
construction, a complete turnover. Because we are interested in the effect
of entrenchment on the form of control device used, we want to minimize the
impact of planned retirements on our results. To this end, we focus on young
BOSSes.The dummy variable '(BOSS is set equal to 1 for companies run by a
BOSS no more than 60 years of age in 1980. Except for members of founding
families, YBOSSes are probably the most difficult to discipline through
internalcontrol devices. Of the 101 BOSSes in the sample, 79 are young
BOSSes ('(BOSSes), andtheother 22 are over 60. By comparison, Ill firms
count among their top management a memberofthe foundingfamily.
Table2presents the characteristics of top management by type of
controlchange. Not surprisingly, a firm experiencing complete turnover is
about 40% as likely to be run by a founder or a member of the founding family
as a residual firm. Similarly, targets of hostile takeovers are only S5%as
likelyto be run by a memberofthe founding family as residual firms. In
contrast, firmsrun byfoundingfamiliesare more likely to be targets of
friendly acquisitions than residual fins, although this result is only
marginallysignificAnt.This finding replicates the result in Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) that founders are harder to force out in a hostile
takeover but are more likely to sell their firms when they choose to retire
or diversify. The earlier paper did not consider management turnover.
The equity attic, of the Forbes-listed top executive works largely the
same way as the founding family variable. It reduces the likelihood of
complete turnover and of a hostile takeover, but raises that of a friendly18
acquisition. Our preferred interpretation of this result is similar to that
for the founding family variable.
The higher average age of the CEO in firms experiencing complete
turnover probably reflects greater incidence of retirements. More
interesting is the result that the average top executive of a target of a
hostile bid is younger than that of a no outcome firm. This result suggests
that hostile takeovers might be a way to get rid of CEOs with an otherwise
long expected employment with the firm. Top executives of targets of
friendly acquisitions, by contrast, are as old as those of residual fins.
The main results in Table 2 concern the BOSS variable defined above. A
f ira experiencing complete turnover is less likely to be run by a BOSS than a
residualfirm, despite the fact that gturnoverof a BOSS is automatically
a complete turnover. Afirmexperiencing complete turnover is only 30% as
likely to be run by a BOSS aged 60 or under as a residual firm, suggesting
that young BOSSes are relatively immune to internal discipline. Ofcourse,
this may largely reflect a pure age effect. In section 3,we estimatethe
impact of a young BOSS controlling for age.
BOSSes have a radically different experience with hostile takeovers than
they do with complete turnover. Targets of hostile takeovers are more likely
to be nan by both young and old bosses than the no outcome fins, withthe
differences significant at the 10% level. Thus theprobability that a
hostile target is runby a young BOSS is .3,which is 62%higher than .185,
theprobabilitythat a no outcome fin is nan bya youngBOSS. This suggests
that to get rid of a young BOSS one may have to buy the company. Firms
acquiredin friendly deals are also more likely to be runby young BOSSes,
butthis result is notstatistically significant.19
This preliminary evidence suggests that characteristics of management
mightbeextremely important in determining the form of control change. Some
managers,such as founders,ownersoflarge stakes,orBOSSesseem to be
relativelyimmune to internal discipline. But not all of these groups are
equally difficult to remove in a takeover. Young BOSSes in particular may be
a class of mangers against whom hostile takeovers are muchmoreeffective
than action by the board. It is also interesting that friendly takeovers are
more likely to occur in firms with young BOSSes. These may represent
situations in which board members welcome an acquisition because they cannot
work out a solution to their management problem themselves. But these cases
may differ from the hostile takeovers where the board is presumably unwilling
to condone the disciplinary changes sought by the raider.
Althoughthe evidence presented in this section sheds light on the
functioningof various control devices, it is not conclusive. The problemis
thatmany of the performance and management variables are correlated with
each other. In the next section, we turn to a multivariate analysis to
determinewhich characteristics of thefirmdetermine the form of control
change.
3. Nultivariate Analysis.
This section presents 4-choice logit estimates of the determinants of
the form of controlchange. The four choices are: complete turnover ofthe
topmanagement (not followed by an acquisition), hostile takeover, friendly
acquisition andnoneof the above. To avoid inducing spurious correlations
because large firms are less likely to be acquired, we control for firm size
in the logits. The measure of size we use is the logarithm of the market
value of the firm'sassets,calculated identically to the numerator of Q.20
Hence,all the multinomial. logits are estimated on the subsample of 371 firms
forwhich we could compute Q,evenwhen abnormal return or employment growth
is used as the measure of performance. Tables 3 and 4 present the results
using Qasthe measure of performance. The omitted category are firms that
neither were acquired nor experienced a complete turnover (residual firms).
Theresults using Q a. a measure of performance indicate that, relative
tothe probability of being a residual firm, the probability of óomplete
turnover is lower when the firm is run by a member of the founding family,
when the top executive is aged 60 or under, when the firm outperforms its
industry, and when it is run by a BOSS aged 60 or under, although the last
effect is not significant at conventional levels. Since we are controlling
for age, we are capturing the marginal effect of young BOSS only. In the
logit, the log odds of a complete turnover versus no outcome is not
significantly affected by industry Q, or by the equity stake of the top
executive. In terms of probabilities rather than log odds ratios, starting
from the 'base case in which the performance variables are set equal to
their median values and all of the other independent variable, are set equal
to their mean values, when Q relative to industry falls to the top of its
lowest quartile, the estimated probability of a complete turnover rises from
17.7% to 20.0%. The estimated probability drops from l7.7i to 8.8% when the
firm isrun by a memberofthe founding family. These estimated
probabilitiesare contained in Table 4.
The log odds of a friendly acquisition relative to no outcome (residual
firms) does not seem to be significantly affected by almost any of our
variables, although this result is at least partly due to the small number
(17) of friendly acquisitions in the sample forwhichwe have completedata.
Notably, young age, membership in the founding family and ownershipstake21
have no statistically significant influence on the log odds of a friendly
acquisition. We do, however, find the probability of a friendly acquisition
to be higherfor firms runby BOSSes aged 60 or under.
Consistent withour earlier evidence, the log odds of a hostile
takeoverversus no outcome increases with poor performance of the industry
and with poor performance within industry.This log oddsratio is also
higher for firms not run by a member of the founding family and,albeitwith
a t-statistic of only 1.14, firmsthatare run by a youngBOSS.Youngageby
itself has no real effect on the probability of a hostile (or for that matter
friendly) acquisition. Finally, the results indicate that large size reduces
vulnerability to a hostile takeover, as onewouldexpect.
Theseestimates are interpretedin terms of probabilities in Table 4.
Starting at the base case (performance variables at their median values and
all others at their mean values), the probability of a hostile acquisition
increasesfrom 5.7% to 8.4% when industry Q drops to the top of its lowest
quartile. Similarly, the probability of a hostile takeover rises from 5.7%
to 7.4% when DQ falls to the top of its lowest quartile.
Two more results from this regression are worth emphasizing. First,
poor performance within industry is typical of both targets of hostile
takeovers andof I iris experiencing complete turnover, but poor industry
performanceis typical only of the former. The effect of IQ on the log odds
of hostile acquisition versus complete turnover is statistically significant
at the 5% level (t—l.97), whereas the corresponding effect of DQ on the log
odds ratio is not(t—,779).This is consistent with the view that boards are
moresuccessfulin addressing firm-specific than industry-wide problems.
Second, the presence of a BOSS aged 60 or underactuallyhasopposite
effects on the log oddsofcomplete turnover versus no outcome and of hostile22
takeover versus no outcome. The log odds of a complete turnover versus a
hostile takeover decline. significantly (t— 2.03) in the presence of a young
boss. In terms of probabilities, the presence of a young boss is associated
with a rise in the probability of a hostile takeover from 3.7% to 8.8% and a
fall in the probability of complete turnover from 17.7% to 8.7% starting at
the base case (i.e., the mean value of the young BOSS variable).
One interpretation of these results is that young BOSSes can
effectively stand up to the board of directors, but succumb to hostile
bidders. In contrast, members of founding families seem to neither turn ovei
nor lose out to hostile bidders, indicating that they are more effectively
entrenched than the young BOSSes. The ownership stake of the top executive
also has a negative effect on the log odds of both control changes relative
to no outcome, although the estimates are not statistically significant.
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the logit using abnormal returns
for the 1978-1980 period instead of Tobin's Q.Theresults for complete
turnover are very similar to those for 'robin's Q:thepresence of a founder,
young age of the top executive, good performance relative to industry, and
the presence of a young Bossallreduce the log odds of complete turnover
versus no outcome, although the coefficient on the young BOSS variable is not
significant.The estimated probability of a complete turnover rises from
17.9%to 21.1% as 1978-1980 abnormal returns relative to industry declineto
thetop of the lowest quartile starting from the base case. As in the
previous logit, the presence of a young BOSS raises the log odds of a
friendly acquisition. Starting at the base case for all other independent
variables, the estimated probability of a friendly acquisition rises from
4.5%to10.5% going from a firm without a young BOSS to onewith a young
BOSS.23
The most important difference in the results for Tobin's Q and abnormal
returns is that, when abnormalreturns areused, poor performaüce relative to
industry no longer significantly raises the log odds of a hostile takeover.
Using either measure, we have the result that, relative to residual firms,
poor industry performance raises the odds of hostile takeovers, whereas poor
performance within industry raises the odds of complete turnover. The log
odds of a hostile takeover vis a vis complete turnover increases
significantly with poor industry performance measured either by Q (t—l.97) or
abnormal returns (t—l.84). The effect of poor firm-specific performance on
the log odds of a hostile takeover versus complete turnover shows no clear
tendency at all.
The results using abnormal returns also confirm the finding using
tobin's Q that large firm size and the presence of the founding family reduce
the log odds of a hostile acquisition versus no outcome. The presence of a
young Boss raises the log oddsofa hostile takeover (t—1.59).Infact, the
effectof young Bossonthe log odds of complete turnover versus hostile
takeovers is highly significant (t—2.2l). In terms of probabilities rather
than log odds ratios, having a young boss atthehelm isassociatedwith an
estimatedincrease in the probability of hostile takeover from 6.0% to 11.0%
and an estimated reduction in the probability of complete turnover from 17.9%
to 9.2% starting at the base case. These multivariate results bear out our
earlierfinding thatyoung BOSSes are less vulnerable to a threat by the
boardand more vulnerable to one by a takeover artist.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of a aultinomial logit using 1978-
1980employment growth as a performance, measure. Again, theresults fairly
closelytrack those for the other performance measures. The most notable
exception is that the idiosyncratic component of employment growth comes in24
much less strongly in predicting both complete turnover and hostile takeovers
than the idiosyncratic components of either abnormal returns or Tobin's Q.
Thisis consistent with theambiguityofthe firm- specific componentof
employmentgrowthas a measure of relative performance. On the other hand,
lowindustry employment growth predicts hostile takeovers, consistent with
the accuracy of industry employment growth as an indicator of industry
health. The employment numbers thus support our conclusion that hostile
takeoversare targeted at firmsin troubled industries.
4. complete and Partial Turnover.
Oneissueraised in the introduction is whether complete turnover of the
management team (defined usingthelist of signers of the letter to
shareholdersin the annual report) is an adequate proxyfor disciplinary
turnover.We have already recognized that this variable includes some cases
thatare not disciplinary, such as ordinary retirements or deaths of sole
signer..The question addressed in this section is whether the complete
turnovervariable omits some disciplinary replacements. In particular, we
lookat the characteristics of firms experiencing a partial turnover of top
officersto see ifthey look like firms inneed of disciplinary intervention.
On our definition, a firmexperiences partial turnover ifa) its Forbes-
designatedtop officer changes between 1980 and 1985.and b) the turnover of
the list of signers is notcomplete.This definition suggests three ways in
which partial turnover can occur. First, oneofthe 1980 signers could
become the Forbes-listed top executive by 1985. Second, an insider who was
not a signer could get rapidly promoted to top executive, while some of the
1980 signers remain among the top managementsigning the letter in 1985.
Third.a top executive could be brought in from the outside, but some25
managers who signed in 1980 continue to do so in 1985. 01 the 70 cases of
partial turnover, 54 are examples of a 1980 signer becoming the Forbes-listed
top executive in 1985, 6 are examples of an insider who did not sign in 1980
being promoted to top executive by 1985 ahead of some 1980 signers, and 10
are examples of a new top executive being brought from outside, while some
1980 signers continue to sign in 1985. This evidence suggests that partial
turnover consists predominantly of internal succession.
Even internal succession can be disciplinary in nature, however. This
would be the case if the board asks the CEO to resign, but still invites one
of the current top managers to replace him. To evaluate this possibility,
Table 9 presents mean performance characteristics of three types of firms.
These include firms experiencing complete turnover (already described in
Table 1), firms experiencing partial zrnover, and firms in which the 1980
top executive is still at the helm in 1985.
The results on performance measures suggest that firms experiencing
partial turnover do better than firms experiencing complete turnover. In
particular, they have a statistically significantly higher average Qthat
appears to be primarily a within industry effect. Partial turnover firms
have the average DQ of .131, compared to -.138 for complete turnover firms.
The t-statistic for the difference between the two is 2.23. interestingly,
partial turnoverfirms seemto be outperforming even the no turnover firms in
theirindustry (with DQ of .131 compared to .042), although this difference
isnot statistically significant. It is hard to reconcile the result that
firms with partial turnover outperform their industry with the notion that
partial turnover is typically a disciplinary action.
Similar results obtain using abnormal returns as a measure of
performance.Mostimportantly,the firm-specific component of abnormal26
returns is quite different for the twotypesof turnover. Firms experiencing
partial turnover have average fin-specific abnormal return of +12.9%,
compared to -7.1% for the complete turnover fins. The t-statistic for the
difference between the twois2.66. Furthermore, the fin-specific abnormal
return for fins where the Forbes-listed top executive does not change is
only 2.6%. which is much lover than 12.9% (t—l.4l), the figure for partial
turnover firms. This evidence indicates that firms experiencing partial
turnover exhibit superior within-industry performance.
These results suggest that far from being a disciplining device, partial
turnover is more of a reward to the current management team for especially
good performance. This seems plausible: the board should be more inclined tc
picka successor from the incumbent management team when its operating
strategy proves successful and hence worth continuing. Consistent with this
interpretation, the primary source of superior performance is within
industry, where partial turnover firms outperform both complete turnover and
no turnover firms. This evidence supports our not treating partial turnover
as a disciplinary control outcome.
5.ConcludingComments.
This paper hasattemptedto assess the effectiveness of the board of
directors in disciplining top managers. Wehavefound that theboardis not
completely unresponsive to poor performance. When a firm significantly
underperforms its industry, the probability of complete turnover of the top
management team rises. This result suggests thatboardscompare the
performance of the firmwiththatofother firms in its industry, and
sometimes remove top managers when they cannotkeep up with the industry.27
But the 1980s have presented the board of directors with a harder
problem. During this period, because of deregulation, commodity price
shocks, and foreign competition, whole industries such as airlines, oil, and
steel have suffered adverse shocks. As discussed by Jensen (1986) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), shareholder value could be raised in many of
these industries through painful measures such as restructurings, selloff of
assets, employee layoffs, and wage reductions. Despite wide disagreement
about whether there are net social gains from such strategies, it is fair to
say that shareholders typically benefit from them.
The evidence in this paper indicates that the board of directors has not
been a major force in removing unresponsive managers in poorly performing
industries. Instead, this function has been accomplished by hostile
takeovers. Ourevidencesupports the view that takeover organizers have
taken advantage of opportunities raised by the ineffectiveness of internal
control devices such as the board of directors and incentive pay. To the
extent that internal control devices are cheaper to operate and are more
conducive to long-ten planning by incumbent management than are hostile
takeovers, the replacement of the oversight function of the board by the
externalmarket for corporate control might be deemed a third-beet situation.
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) have made some proposals aimed at making internal
control devices more effective, and so rendering hostile takeovers less
importantfor shareholders.28
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JournalofFinancial Economics, 1988.TABLE 1: Means of Performance Variables by Control Outcomet
Complete
management
turnover Hostile Friendly No outcome
1980 Q .734 .524 .774 .932
(-2.20) (-3.00) (-.856)
1980 Industry Q .831 .691 .862 .855
(-.395) (-2.02) (.0696)
1980 Q- IndustryQ .138 -.139 -.0370 .0647
(-2.56) (-1.79) (-.662)
Total abnormal stock -.0729 -.113 -.0561 .0519
return 1978-1980 (-2.19) (-2.03) (-1.17)
Industry abnormal stock .0138 -.0850 .0944 .0051
return 1978-1980 (.229) (-1.76) (1.54)
Abnormal stock return . -.0714 -.0531 -.149 .0507
industryabnormalstock (-2.08) (-1.24) (-2.34)
return 1978-1980
Employment growth rate .0184 .0152 .0195 .0476
1978-1980 (-1.86) (-1.36) (-1.11)
Industryemployment .0376 .0220 .0472 .0376
growthrate 1978-1980 (-.0086) (-1.79) (1.00)
Employmentgrowth rate--.0220 -.0081 -.0277 .0115
Industry growth rate (-1.92) (-.763) (-1.44)
1978- 19 80
aNumbers in parentheses are t-statistics for test of equality of means
forno outcome andrespectivecontrol outcome.
bAll abnormal returns are estimated from a monthly CAP?! equation for 1.178
through 12/80. These numbers are converted to total abnormal returns over
the period 1/78-12/80 for ease of interpretation.TABLE 2:Means of Characteristi%s of Top Management for Different
Control Outcomes, 19B0
Complete
Turnover Hostile Friendly No outcome
Founding familyrepresented .118 .100 .412 .286
on top management team (-3.30) (-2.52) (1.52)
Equity stake of top .0266 .0103 .0978 .0547
executive (-1.99) (-2.26) (1.80)
Age of top executive 60.6 55.0 57.1 56.3
in 1980 (6.09) (-1.21) (.628)
One-man top management .161 .35 .265 .220
team (BOSs—i) (-1.21) (1.83) (.596)
Young one-man top .0538 .300 .265 .185
management team (age (-3.08) (1.71) (1.12)
of boss ￿ 60)
aNuabers in parentheses are t-statistics for test of equality of means for no









Intercept .954 2.39 -1.85
(1.09) (1.88) (-1.13)
LogofTotal Market Value -.101 -.434 -.0867
(-.796) (-2.27) (-.374)
Founding Family on Top -1.14 -1.41 -.388
Mgmt. Team —1 (-2.40) (-1.69) (-.596)
Age of top executive 60 -1.54 -.139 -.550
in 1980 —1. (-4.89) (-.256) (-.836)
Equity stake of top executive -1.29 -7.00 1.90
(-.787) (-1.22) (1.02)
Young one-man top management -.850 .540 1.12
team (age of boss S 60) (-1.49) (1.14) (1.85)
Industry Q - .140 -1.84 -.0878
(-.378) (-2.25) (-.139)
Q- IndustryQ -.949 -1.68 -.321
(-2.28) (-1.90) (-.521)
N —353
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.TABI2 4:RstiaatqdProbabilitiesfrom )fultthomialLogitModel Using
ToWn'sQas aPerformance Measure
ProbabilityProbability Probability Probability
of Completeof Hostile of Friendlyof No Con-
Turnover Takeover Takeovertrol Chante
Base casea .177 .057 .049 .717
Founding family present .088 .023 .043 .846
No founding family .216 .074 .049 .662
Age of CEO >60 .389 .046 .052 .513
Age of CEO ￿ 60 .125 .059 .045 .770
Young one-man top .087 .088 .120 .705
management tea
No young one-man .203 .051 .039 .706
topmanagement team
Industry Q attop of .176 .084 .048 .692
lowest quartile
Q-IndustryQattop .200 .074 .049 .671
oflowest quartile
ame base case is where the performance variables are at their medians and
all other variables are at their means. The rows following the base case
are estimated probabilities evaluated at various points differing from the





Intercept .877 1.27 -1.72
(.962) (.937) (-1.04)
LogofTotal Market Value - .0955 - .466 - .132
(-.765) (-2.39) (-.606)
Founding Family on Top -1.22 -1.42 -.611
Mgmt. Team —1 (-2.49) (-1.67) (- .883)
Age of top executive60 -1.64 -.382 - .464
in 1.980 —1 (-5.13) (- .689) (- .677)
Equity stake of top executive - .479 -5.37 3.56
(-.261) (-.952) (1.61)
Young one-man top management - .770 .778 1.08
team (age of boss ￿ 60) (.1.34) (1.59) (1.80)
Industry abnormal return -.00687 -68.00 25.76
1/78-12/80 (monthly) (-.000349) (-1.99) (.778).
Abnormal return-Industry -31.58 -28.97 -25.97
abnormal return 1/78-12/80 (-2.39) (-1.43) (-1.12)
(monthly)
N —341
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.TABLE 6:Estimated Probabilities fret Multinomial LogitModel Using
Abnormal Returnas aPerformanceMeasure
ProbabilityProbabilityProbability Probability
of Completeof Hostile of Friendlyof No Con-
Turnover Takeover Takeovertrol Change
Base casea .179 .060 .045 .716
Founding family present .084 .024 .034 .858
No founding family .219 .076 .047 .657
Age of CEO >60 .404 .055 .043 .497
Age of CEO60 .123 .058 .043 .776
Young one-man top .092 .110 .105 .693
management team
No young one-man .204 .051 .036 .708
top managementteam
Industryabnormal return at .177 .077 .040 .706
top of lowest quartile
Abnormalreturnindustry .211 .069 .051 .669
abnormal return at top of
lowest quartile
aBasecase is where theperformance variables are at their medians andall
othervariables are at their means. The rowsfollowing the base ease are
estimated probabilities evaluated at various points differing from the base








Intercept 1.40 2.45 -1.75
(1.63) (1.96) (-1.07)
LogofTotal Market Value -.167 -.583 -.141
(-1.39) (-3.16) (-.638)
FoundingFamily on Top -1.07 -1AJ -.332
Mgmt. Team —1 (-2.35) (-1.77) (- .519)
Age of top executive ￿ 60 -1.62 - .269 - .624
in 1980 —1 (-5.29) (-.501) (- .949)
Equity stake of top executive -1.58 -7.64 1.77
(-.956) (-1.21) (.975)
Young one-man top management - .820 .738 1.12
team (age of boss ￿ 60) (-1.43) (1.54) (1.83)
Industryemployment growth -1.14 -9.20 4.91
1978-1980 (-.354) (-2.01) (.943)
Employment growth -Industry -3.52 -2.62 -.710
employment growth 1978-1980 (-1.74) (-1.00) ( .342)
N —359
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.TABLE I: Estimated ProbabilitIes fromKultinotial Logit NodetUsing
EmploymentGrowth asa Performance Measure
ProbabilityProbabilityProbability Probability
ofCompleteof Hostile of Friendlyof No Con-
Turnover Takeover Takeovertrol Change
Basecasea .182 .056 .045 .717
Founding family present .095 .021 .041 .843
No founding family .217 .074 .045 .664
Age of CEO >60 .407 .047 .069 .498
Age of CEO60 .126 .056 .041 .778
Young one-man top .090 .100 .109 .700
managementteam
No young one-man .207 .049 .036 .708
top management team
Industryemployment .184 .069 .039 .708
growthrate at top of
lowest quartile
Employment growth rate - .204 .060 .044 .692
industry employment growth
rate at top of lowest
quartile
amebasecase is where the performance variables are at their medians and
all other variables are at their means. The rows following the base case
are estimated probabilities evaluated at various points differing from the
base case only in the value of the respective independent variable.TARLE 9:Means of Performance Variable! by Control Outcomet
14o outcomeComDlete turnoverPartial turnover
Q .894 .734 1.04
(1.31) (2.27)
Industry Q .849 .831 .873
(.342) (.554)
Q- IndustryQ .0415 -.138 .131
(.945) (2.23)
Total abnormal returnb .0285 -.0729 .125
(1.30) (2.55)
Industry abnormal return .0090 .0138 -.0069
(.370) (.441)
Abnormal return -Industry .0256 -.0714 .129
abnormal return (1.41) (2.66)
aNumbers in parentheses are t-statistics for test of equality of means for
partial turnover and respective control outcome.
bAll abnormal returns are estimated from a monthly CAPM equation for 1/78
through 12/80. These numbers are converted to total abnormal returns over
the period 1/78 -12/80for ease of interpretation.